In a November 13, 2026 decision, a First Circuit panel vacated the dismissal of Marshall v. Blanche. The New Hampshire plaintiff challenged 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) after two Massachusetts DUI convictions were treated as felonies that bar him from possessing firearms. The panel held that Torres-Rosario no longer controls after Levasseur and remanded the case for analysis under New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen.
Section 922(g)(1) is the federal felon-in-possession ban. It makes firearm possession a crime for any person convicted of an offense punishable by more than one year in prison. Massachusetts DUI convictions met that threshold in this case. The federal consequence is not a short license suspension. It is a prohibition on keeping and bearing arms, enforced as a separate federal felony.

Torres-Rosario had controlled as-applied challenges to that statute in the First Circuit. Levasseur changed the circuit's law. The panel in Marshall v. Blanche held that Torres-Rosario no longer controls. Precedent that once ended these suits at the courthouse door cannot be used to skip the Second Amendment inquiry Bruen requires. The government lost that shortcut.
Remand for a Bruen analysis
Bruen supplies the test the district court must now apply. The Second Amendment's text covers possession of firearms by the people. When that text is implicated, the government must demonstrate that the regulation is consistent with this Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation. A federal statute does not prove its own constitutionality. Congress cannot legislate away a right the Constitution already secured.
Marshall v. Blanche is an as-applied case. The First Circuit did not facially invalidate § 922(g)(1). It vacated a dismissal and ordered the lower court to run the historical analysis Bruen requires. Two Massachusetts DUI convictions are the facts that must be measured against that tradition. DUI convictions used as federal disarmament predicates are no longer insulated by discarded circuit precedent.
The district court will have to decide whether applying the felon ban to this plaintiff squares with the right to keep and bear arms. That is a constitutional question, not an administrative one. State felony labels do not amend the Second Amendment. The panel sent the dispute back so that question is actually asked.
What follows is litigation on remand, not a final judgment on the merits. The government must now justify this use of § 922(g)(1) with historical analogues, not with Torres-Rosario. Marshall's challenge to the federal felon gun ban is back before a trial court that can no longer treat the statute as self-executing. Judges and executive officers swear an oath to the Constitution. A DUI docket does not cancel that oath, and a statute does not outrank it.
